The Long-Awaited Connecticut School Finance Decision

I'll have more to say on this later, but for those of you who remember that the Connecticut Supreme Court heard oral arguments in the state's school finance adequacy case nearly two years ago, the court issued its decision Monday. 

In Connecticut Coalition for Justice in Education Funding, Inc. v. Rell, the court ruled that the issue of whether education funding legislation in Connecticut makes "suitable provision" for education is justiciable.  The Connecticut Constitution's Education Clause provides, "There shall always be free public elementary and secondary schools in the state.  The general assembly shall implement this principle by appropriate legislation."  Conn. Const. art. 8, sec. 1.  

The court first determined that the terms "elementary," "secondary," and "schools" are "ambiguous."  Slip. Op. at 20.  Then, the court held that the word "appropriate" explicitly called for judicial involvement.  Next, extending, by negative implication, the dissenting opinion of one of the justices in the Horton equity case, the court held that the education clause, despite its minimalistic terms, contains "substantive content."  Slip. Op. at 22.  Then, based on the testimony of the "principal draftsman" of the education clause that he introduced the provision to signify the importance of education in the state, the court held that, despite the failure of this draftsman to include terms of quality in the text, his own personal opinions about education should "inform our construction."  Slip. Op. at 28. 

Next, after reviewing the decisions of selected sister states and several public policy considerations, the court held that the constitutional text above, along with all of these considerations, guaranteed the children of Connecticut with an education "suitable to give them the opportunity to be responsible citizens"; that such an education should "prepare students to progress to higher education institutions, or to obtain productive employment"; and that such an education includes four "essential features" (borrowed verbatim from the first Campaign decision in New York): (1) minimally adequate physical facilities; (2) minimally adequate instrumentalities of learning; (3) minimally adequate teaching and curricular offerings; and (4) sufficient personnel adequately trained to teach the subjects.  Slip. Op. at 36-37. 

Finally, the court made two defendant-friendly holdings that could limit the reach of its opinion on remand.  First, adopting again the reasoning of the Campaign I court in New York (reasoning which the Campaign II court arguably repudiated), the Connecticut court held that the plaintiffs would have to establish a causal link between any established inadequacies and legislative action.  Second, in footnote 59 on the opinion, the court adopted a form of a "rational basis" test as a way of determinining constitutionality on remand: Speaking of the legislature and education board, the court stated: "So long as those authorities prescribe and implement a program of instruction rationally calculated to enforce the constitutional right to a minimally adequate education as set forth herein, then the judiciary should stay its hand." 

The opinion is long and somewhat convoluted, but it is not as earth-shattering as it may appear on first glance.  I see this as potentially one more state (after Texas, Indiana, Missouri, Oregon, and Colorado recently) which has held the education clause justiciable, but has imposed a very lenient standard of review.  Considering the language regarding the causal link (nearly impossible to establish) and the footnote calling for rational basis review, this case may prove to be expensive and fruitless on remand. 

Comments

[Daniel Kiel]

I was gonna post on this, but I'm glad I didn't since your knowledge clearly is deeper than mine. So, thanks.

I do have a question or two, though...as I've read the media reports of the opinion, it seems that there is a significant raising of the "adequacy" bar in this case. In other words, adequacy (even "minimal adequacy") now means that the obligation is to put together schools that can make students responsibile citizens, move on to higher education, or obtain productive employment. That's more the 4 features the court identifies - indeed, those features are merely an evaluation tool to determine whether the adequacy bar is reached. Aren't the fights now going to be about what level of quality meets the adequacy standard? In other states that require some sort of adequate education, how high is the adequacy bar? Is this unique and new or just Connecticut's version of the same old thing?

[Scott Bauries]

Thanks for the coment, Daniel. If one reads the main text of the opinion (as news writers do), one sees what appears to be a very demanding set of "adequacy" criteria that seem to place a very high duty on the state. But if one reads these criteria together with the actual adjudicatory standards set forth in the case (the requirement for establishment of a causal link and the indication that a legislative system rationally directed at the adequacy factors will survive judicial scrutiny) seem to paint a much less demanding picture. Of course, on remand, the court could focus on the adequacy factors (which are themselves nebulous statements of "sufficiency" or "suitability"), ignore the more demanding adjudicatory standards, and craft an ad hoc judgment of general "inadequacy," as the New York Court of Appeals did in Campaign II. Based on the pace of the case so far, it will likely be several years before we find out.